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Abstract: 
This essay is an exploration in ethical rhetoric, specifically, the ethics of comparing the status of 
fetuses and animals to enslaved Africans. On the view of those who make such comparisons, the 
fetus is treated as a slave through abortion, reproductive technologies, and stem cell research, 
while animals are enslaved through factory farming, experimentation, and as laborers, circus 
performers, and the like. I explore how the apotheosis of the fetus and the humanization of 
animals represent the flipside of the subjugation and animalization of black people. At their 
ethical best, those who compare aborted fetuses and abused animals with enslaved black people 
have laudable ethical goals. The anti-abortion right and the animal rights left, respectively, wish 
to abolish abortion (and associated reproductive technologies that harm prenatal life) and the 
unethical treatment of animals. They seek, respectively, to reimagine the ethical-political status 
of the fetus and to criticize the animalization of animals, the practice of constructing them as 
beasts. While sympathetic to these goals, I worry about the comparative diminution of the 
historical, literal enslavement of black people. To what extent, I ask, does the comparative 
ethical rhetoric of fetal slaves and animal slaves affect historical constructions of black people as 
beastly and disposable? 
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Article: 
By 1860 the dollar value of America's slaves—there were about four million slaves by 
1860—but the dollar value of those slaves was greater than the dollar value of all of 
America's banks, all of America's railroads, all of America's manufacturing combined. 
When you look at how the economics of slavery translated into the general economy of 
the nation, then you can see that slavery was not just some side show in American 
society, it was the main event in American history. —James Horton, Emeritus Professor 
of History at George Washington University (Dewery 2012, quote begins at 3:55) 
Slavery (as well as the dispossession of Indian land) was the primitive stage of capital 
accumulation in American history. Or, given its outsized role in the economy of the Atlantic 
world during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the traffic in enslaved Africans was not 
merely a phenomenon of primitive accumulation. Slaveholder capitalism was the definitive form 
of capital accumulation (Johnson 2013, 10–11, 244–79, especially 254). We should not be 
surprised that this act of wealth production through pillage and theft (see Marx 1976, 873–942) 
has left multiple traces in ethical rhetoric. Some of these traces preceded the wholesale enslaving 
of Africans during the Atlantic slave trade. For example, slavery has been used as a trope for 
ignorance, sin, or, conversely, subjection to the will of the biblical god; Pauline Christians 
described themselves as “slaves of Christ” (see Martin 1990). Other rhetorical traces appear to be 
deeply rooted in the specificity of enslaved Africans1 : for example, the Victorian and 
Progressive Era trope “white slavery,” which plays on the normative construction of slavery as a 
black phenomenon. White slavery refers prototypically to the sexual exploitation of white 
women through prostitution (Irwin 1996). Theoretically, any woman could be sexually exploited. 
Under slavery, where sexual assault against black women (and men) was a property right, only 
white women were regarded as victims of sexual exploitation. Whiteness normed the very idea of 
who could be an object of moral concern. The white slavery trope provides a racial and gender 
contrast to the normativity of African enslavement. As image and norm among norms, 
the transgender enslaving of black people stereotyped the very idea of slavery. 
I contend that the anti-slavery movement—the struggle against the chattel enslavement of people 
of African descent—provides the model for social movements against abortion and the unethical 
treatment of animals. By defining prenatal human life and animals as slaves, participants in these 
movements adopt the ethical rhetoric of the antebellum abolitionists. Ascriptions of personhood 
and of species-transcending rights carry the moral imperative to abolish abortion, reproductive 
technologies, the therapeutic use of fetal stem cells, and the unethical treatment of animals. The 
latter practice includes consuming animals as food, wearing them as clothing, and “processing” 
them for various purposes. In the fetus-as-slave and animal-as-slave tropes, we confront an 
ethical-political struggle regarding the propriety of certain forms of ethical rhetoric and 
ultimately the very meaning of slavery and abolition. These discourses regarding the ethical 
status of fetuses and animals, respectively, transcend the conventional left/right ideological 
spectrum. By taking the enslavement of black people as a historical marker and living metaphor, 
these forms of ethical rhetoric represent a peculiar manifestation of the discourse of race. 
Slavery and Racialization 
In Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study, Orlando Patterson challenges three fallacies: 
the modern legalistic notion that ownership and property rights define slavery, the claim that 
slaveholding societies did not recognize slaves as persons in law, and the alleged uniqueness of 
enslaved people as disposable capital. On the contrary, he argues: “Proprietary claims and 
powers are made with respect to many persons who are clearly not slaves. Indeed any person, 
beggar or king, can be the object of a property relation. Slaves are no different in this respect” 
(Patterson 1982, 21). Second, concluding that slaveholding societies did not recognize the 
personhood of slaves confuses jurisprudence (the philosophy of law) with the historical and 
empirical practice of law. Always and everywhere, slaves have been subject to law: their 
personhood acknowledged in practice even if denied theoretically. Finally, capitalist, “free-
market” relations subject everyone to being bought and sold, whether sex worker or professional 
athlete. Few workers (slave or free) have the power to significantly influence the terms of their 
commodification. The market subjects every worker to depreciation. All persons can be treated 
as capital; slaves are merely the most vulnerable and disposable form of interest-bearing property 
(Patterson 1982, 21–24). 
Against these inadequate accounts, Patterson offers the following definition: “slavery is the 
permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons” 
(Patterson 1982, 13). Unlike indentured servitude, slavery has no term-limit. Lifelong and 
heritable, the children of enslaved people are born as slaves. Violent subjection and domination 
underwrites a permanent relationship between owner, human chattel, and offspring. Slavery 
institutionalizes and structures violence through law, ritual, and etiquette. Cut off from her 
community of birth— from ancestors and descendants—bereft of the mutuality, recognition, and 
honor those relations sustained, and deprived of a legal right to her own life, the enslaved person 
is socially dead. As a substitute for the actual death defeated enemies “deserve,” social 
death places her outside the regime of recognition, honor, and rights (Patterson 1982, 26, 38–39, 
95–96). Patterson concludes by arguing that slavery is a form of human parasitism. Like a 
noxious bloodsucker, the slaveholder/parasite feeds on the life, body, and capacities, of the 
enslaved/host. Virtually without exception, slaveholders describe their act of violently 
subjugating and dominating others as premised on the dependence of the enslaved. By 
ideologically inverting and mischaracterizing the truth, they present the slaveholder/enslaved 
relationship as benevolent. Educated by the experience of slavery, no one desires freedom more 
intensely than the enslaved (Patterson 1982, 335, 337, 339, 341–42). Conversely, no one fears 
enslavement more than slaveholders. 
Slavery as metaphor for the relation between fetus and pregnant woman and for the unethical 
treatment of animals presupposes a long history of racialization: specifically, the construction of 
an isomorphism between blackness, African, and slave. Prior to the Atlantic slave trade (and 
contemporaneous with it), Mediterranean and Indian Ocean slave traders plied their ugly 
business. Arab traffickers were prominent in both trades and Africans2 were well represented 
among those captured and sold. Africans were hardly the only people enslaved: Europeans were 
trafficked along the Barbary Coast between 1500 and 1800 CE, their numbers significant enough 
to impress memory and leave material traces (Davis 2004, 3–5, 24–26). Despite the presence of 
white slaves, the association of slavery, blackness, and Africans was already well established 
among Arab and Iberian slave traders when the transatlantic trade began. According to Patterson, 
“In every slaveholding society, we find visible marks of servitude, some pointed, some more 
subtle. Where the slave was of a different race or color, this fact tended to become associated 
with slave status—and not only in the Americas.” Indeed, Africans perceived racial differences 
among themselves (Patterson 1982, 58). From the very “beginning of the Atlantic slave trade in 
the fifteenth century Black and slave were inextricably joined in the Christian mind” 
(Goldenberg 2003, 3). Why did Christians make this association? How did slavery become a 
black phenomenon, an attribute of and the presumed status of Africans? 
To explain this association, David M. Goldenberg turns to the peculiar biblical story of Noah and 
Ham in which, after waking from a drunken stupor, Noah somehow knows that his son Ham has 
behaved disrespectfully toward him while he was vulnerable. Unlike his brothers who averted 
their eyes and discreetly covered their drunk and naked father, Ham reacted with glee, if not with 
“perverse” desire.3 In the most peculiar part of the story, Noah reacts to Ham's indiscretion in a 
bizarre manner by cursing his own grandson Canaan, Ham's son. An angry Noah proclaims: 
“Cursed be Canaan; a slave of slaves shall he be to his brothers” (Gen. 9:25). From antebellum 
America stretching back more than a millennium, commentators have cited the misnamed “Curse 
of Ham” as justification for enslaving black people. The curse is usually interpreted as holding 
force in perpetuity. Goldenberg attributes responsibility for the association of black people and 
slavery to a postbiblical tradition of interpretation, according to which “phenotypically black 
people” descend from Canaan. Interpreters take the widespread practice of enslaving Africans as 
confirming the biblical story. 
Goldenberg provides a number of reasons for associating black skin with slavery. First, he 
describes an apparent universal preference for lighter complexioned women across racial 
groups.4 He argues that the aesthetic preference for fair skin binds up with a universal color 
symbolism that associates light with good and dark with bad. Goldenberg denies the literal or 
ethnic nature of this symbolism. The blackness of Cain, Ham, and Esau refers to their ethical 
status and relationship to God, not to their literal skin color. We see the same interpretive 
practice when Origen takes “the blackness of the Ethiopians as a metaphor for sin” 
(Goldenberg 2003, 3, 82–83, 155).5 But mistaken etymologies did lead some to think that Ham 
meant hot, dark, or black, and therefore that his descendants were Africans. Goldenberg shows 
that these etymologies are mistaken. “To the early Hebrews, then, Ham did not represent the 
father of hot, black Africa and there is no indication from the biblical story that God intended to 
condemn black-skinned people to eternal slavery” (Goldenberg 2003, 141, 144, 149). 
Goldenberg also denies that blackness was a racial descriptor for postbiblical Jewish writers such 
as Philo or for the early church fathers (Goldenberg 2003, 151). Independent of this biblical 
story, people in the Roman world and the Near East had come to associate black people with 
slavery.6 Most black people they encountered were enslaved. After the Muslim conquest of 
North Africa in the seventh century, these disparate traditions of color symbolism and false 
etymologies regarding the meaning of the name “Ham” fatefully combined with old associations 
between slavery and Africans. Goldenberg remarks that “The two independent Near Eastern 
etiologies of slavery and dark skin were joined to create a new etiology of the Black slave, thus 
underpinning the new social order” (Goldenberg 2003, 170–71). Eventually, this interpretation 
became ubiquitous among Muslims, Christians, and Jews: 
In the Arabic-speaking world, where the enslavement of black Africans was extensive 
and early, reliance on the Curse never ceased. Among Jewish writers in the Christian 
West, we begin to see a Curse of Ham mentioned at the same time that Christian writers 
mention it, for example, in Moses Arragel's fifteenth-century Castilian commentary to the 
Bible (on Gen 9:25): “Canaan was a slave from slaves [that is, his father, Ham was a 
slave]: Some say that these are the black Moors who, wherever they go, are captives.” It 
is not clear who the “some say” are. In any case, beginning in the fifteenth century Jews 
too rely on the verse in their explanations for the state of things in the world. … 
As the Black slave trade moved to England and then America, the Curse of Ham moved 
with it. … It was the ideological cornerstone for the justification of black 
slavery. (Goldenberg 2003, 175) 
Goldenberg's account of the postbiblical career of the Curse of Ham (the afterlife of the biblical 
Curse of Canaan) provides a conceptual history of the racialization of slavery.7 In seventeenth-
century Virginia, politicians codified this race-making statutorily by distinguishing slavery from 
indentured servitude. In contrast to white bonded servants, these laws deemed the servitude of 
black people as permanent and heritable. 
One could argue that the racialization of New World slavery, especially in the United States of 
America, represents the definitive act in the construction of racial identity. In a world where the 
indigenous population was reduced through the genocidal effects of microbial shock, 
dispossession, and government supported policies of extermination that construed natives as a 
dying race that needed a not so gentle push, black equaled slave and white equaled free. This was 
the historical matrix of racialization in America. “Slave” is the primordial and prototypical 
Blackamerican identity and it shadows all subsequent iterations. 
Dred Scott, Jane Roe, and the Fetus 
In the wake of Roe v. Wade, the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion, one of 
the great conceits of the anti-abortionist position has been the claim that the fetus is the new 
Dred Scott. An enslaved man of African descent, Scott's peripatetic subjection to three 
successive slaveholders carried him from Illinois to the Wisconsin territory, St. Louis, Missouri, 
Louisiana, and again to St. Louis. While subject to John Emerson, a slaveholder and army 
physician, Scott married Harriet Robinson. Marriage brought the fear of family separation. 
Splitting enslaved families to cover debts or as punishment (selling them down the river) was 
among the cruelest and most-anxiety-producing practices of slaveholders. According to Austin 
Allen, Dred and Harriet Scott “worked together as a family unit whose actions centered on 
preventing the separation of themselves and their children.” They had two daughters and were 
doing everything they could, within their constrained circumstances as enslaved people, to hold 
their family together (A. Allen 2006, 140, 143, 147). In 1846, after his attempt to purchase 
freedom for self and family was rebuffed by Emerson's widow, Scott sued for freedom in a St. 
Louis circuit court (Finkelman 1997, 14–19). Without prejudice to a subsequent filing, the court 
dismissed the case on a technicality. In a second trial, the court held in favor of Dred and Harriet 
Scott. Irene Emerson appealed the decision to the Missouri Supreme Court, which overruled the 
circuit court and ended a nearly three decade practice of granting the appeals of enslaved 
petitioners in similar cases. Scott took his petition to federal court and it eventually landed on the 
docket of the Supreme Court of the United States (Finkelman 1997, 22–23, 27). The defendant in 
the case was John A. Sanford (misspelled by the court as Sandford), the brother and business 
agent of Irene Emerson. InDred Scott v. Sandford (1857), the court denied Scott's petition for 
freedom and affirmed his status as a slave. The court held that blacks could never be citizens of 
the United States and declared unconstitutional the Missouri Compromise that—in the interest of 
white people, slaveholders and non-holders alike—had moderated intersectional strife for two 
generations by permitting slavery in Missouri while prohibiting the practice in the western 
territories and the northern part of the Louisiana territory (Finkelman 1997, 4, 6, 36). 
In a strange historical twist, the Scotts were emancipated the same year that the Supreme Court 
ruled against them. Irene Emerson, the woman who for eleven years had contested their petitions 
for freedom, married a man who opposed slavery. In deference to him, she gave possession of 
the Scotts to Taylor Blow. The son of Dred Scott's original owner and an opponent of slavery, 
Blow set the Scotts free. Dred Scott lived the rest of his life as a freeman. But his taste of 
freedom was bitterly short. He died from tuberculosis in 1858 (Waltz 2007, 140). History has not 
recorded the fate of Harriet and the girls. The Dred Scott decision underscored the undeniable 
fact that the Constitution of the United States was the very proslavery document that William 
Lloyd Garrison condemned as “a covenant with death and an agreement with hell” (Mayer 1998, 
531). As an essential feature, conditioning its very possibility, the Constitution codified the acts 
of enslaving, subordinating, and racializing of black people (Graber 2006, 12).8 Insofar as we 
take the Dred Scott/fetus allegory seriously, I think that the recent spate of anti-abortion 
personhood amendments is best understood in light of Chief Justice Taney's infamous remarks 
about the status of black people: 
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and 
altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far 
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro 
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and 
treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. 
This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was 
regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or 
supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and 
habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without 
doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.9 
Through a creative misreading of the Dred Scott case among other things, anti-abortionists make 
the normative claim that the fetus is a person. Personhood is not only an argument for the 
humanity of the fetus but also for its rights-bearing ethical-political status. On this view, the 
fetus, the unborn, is a subject of rights in ways that the dead are not. In a very limited sense we 
do recognize the dead as subjects of rights. Though only the living can vindicate the rights of the 
dead, we generally recognize such rights by placing sanctions on the abuse of the corpse and the 
desecration of burial places.10 Insofar as anti-abortionists construe Dred Scott as a case about the 
personhood of enslaved black people, they misread the meaning of the case. The justices denied 
neither the humanity nor personhood of black people. Rather, the justices affirmed the degraded 
status, legal inferiority, and non-citizenship of black people: their exclusion from the ethical-
political community. 
During the past few years, a wave of personhood amendments has captured the public's 
attention.11 These state-level efforts seek to curtail and eventually eliminate abortion and fetal 
stem cell research by promoting the personhood rights of the unborn through constitutional 
amendments. In some respect, they are tactical responses to the failure to pass such an 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The website of the anti-abortion group Personhood USA 
claims: “Personhood is a movement working to respect the God-given right to life by 
recognizing all human beings as persons who are ‘created in the image of God’ from the 
beginning of their biological development, without exceptions” (Personhood USA 2013). The 
group's website is professionally maintained, exhibits high quality “production values,” and is 
easy for users to navigate. A striking feature of the homepage is an introductory video clip 
featuring an image of Martin Luther King, Jr. speaking at what appears to be the Lincoln 
Memorial. A narrator claims that “personhood is the new civil rights movement of the twenty 
first century.” Adjacent to this screen is a list of Twitter posts. On the day I accessed the site, one 
post read: “Black women r 12% of the population but 37% of #abortions [sic]. … U betraying 
the black race!” Another post read: “Slavery was once legal! We will end abortion!” 
(Personhood USA 2013). If you click the “What is Personhood?” link (located below a 
redundant link to the homepage in the top-right corner) and scroll to the bottom of the page you 
will find a quote attributed to the Virginia Supreme Court (1858): “In the eyes of the law … the 
slave is not a person” (Personhood USA 2013). An accompanying passage explicitly associates 
the personhood of slave and fetus: “Throughout history, certain people [and] groups have felt the 
brunt of a system which denied their humanity, stripped their personhood, and subjected them to 
horrors beyond measure. While the legal framework that made such horrors possible has now 
been removed, it remains firmly in place for preborn Americans” (Personhood USA 2013). 
This web content, as well as the posts, reveal two ways that race plays a role in anti-abortion 
discourse. The first Twitter post associates abortion with black genocide and the alleged racial 
treachery of black women. In the second post, the writer does not explicitly say that abortion is 
tantamount to slavery. Nor does the post address the dominant racialized image of the slave as 
black. But associating abortion with slavery marks the fetus, potentially, as black. The web text 
makes the slave/fetus association explicit. Within a white supremacist economy of perception, 
observers perceive those racially marked as deviant. As the norm that constructs and governs 
racial perception, whiteness goes unmarked—it represents normality, the unspoken norm. 
Normative whiteness governs discussions of the unborn; thus the fetus is typically racially 
unmarked, universal, and white. In contrast to the black body of the slave, the ideal image of the 
fetus in anti-abortion discourse is white. On the basis of these depictions as well as others, I 
discern four racial constructions of the fetus. First, the unmarked fetus is normatively white. 
Second, discourse regarding genocide marks the fetus as black.12 (In this peculiar exception to 
the typical racial construction of the fetus, there is an odd ideological “marriage of convergence” 
between retrograde white anti-abortionists and paranoid Black Nationalists.) Third, white 
supremacist accounts, in contrast to Black Nationalist ones, construe the identity of the fetus 
under genocidal threat as white.13 Finally, when anti-abortionists associate the fetus with the 
slave (read: enslaved black person), an oblique and ambiguous act of racializing occurs—this 
represents a tactical move and performative act of ethical rhetoric that makes the ostensibly 
unmarked fetus “pass” as black. 
Fetal Slaves and Female Slaveholders 
I know of no one who claims that fetuses are literally subject to enslavement. The slave analogy 
is obviously a metaphor, a piece of ethical rhetoric. The metaphor seduces people to think 
differently about the ethical status of the unborn.14 Debora Threedy's “Slavery Rhetoric of the 
Abortion Debate” (1994) represents, in my view, the best effort to sort through this issue. 
Threedy is clearly aware of the standard definition of rhetoric as the persuasive use of language. 
She notes that rhetorical appeals are typically rational, emotional, and/or ethical. Though she 
does not cite Kenneth Burke, it is apparent that she views rhetorical terms as “terministic 
screens” (Burke 1966, 50)—they enable our ability to see some things while disabling our vision 
of others. Threedy analyzes the use of the slave metaphor in legal arguments by advocates and 
opponents of women's reproductive freedom. The object of my analysis concerns the perspective 
these metaphors provide regarding the racialization of black people. Throughout this section, I 
refer to advocates of women's reproductive freedom and opponents of abortion, respectively, as 
“pros” and “contras.” 
The particulars of Threedy's analysis play as follows: pros construe unwanted pregnancies and 
the denial of abortion as tantamount to enslaving the pregnant woman, of subjecting her to the 
dominion of the fetus; in contrast, contras construct the fetus—indeed, the unborn at every stage 
of development—as enslaved by pregnant women and their medical enablers. On the one hand, 
the pregnant woman is the slave, on the other, the fetus. In their train, these analogies pull many 
of the standard associations: the humiliation of enslavement, the illegality of resistance and 
escape, and the Underground Railroad as path to freedom. Threedy identifies a duality and 
subtlety in the contras' argument that the pros lack. Contras claim explicitly that the Supreme 
Court decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) is analogous to Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857). If slaves 
had no rights that a white man was bound to respect, then the contemporary culture of death has 
no respect for the unborn (Threedy 1994, 2–3). 
Threedy comprehends the ethical problems associated with the use of the slave metaphor in the 
abortion debate.15 Do pros and contras use the historic enslavement of black people cynically or 
otherwise inappropriately? While acknowledging that the class “enslaved black people” included 
many pregnant women and their fetuses, does the appropriation of the slave metaphor trivialize 
the nature of racial slavery and do an injustice to the ethics of memory?16 Do these metaphors 
operate perversely as terministic screens that enable us to forget the terror and the horror of 
slavery? Are they goads to forgetfulness, an immoral holiday?17 In short, are these metaphors 
racist through intention and/or in effect? These are my questions but they accord with Threedy's 
concerns: “To analogize the slave to the helpless, irrational (because pre-rational), voiceless and 
utterly dependent fetus reflects, at best, an unconscious paternalism and, at worst, a comparison 
that is as offensive as the antebellum legal analogy of the slave to a horse or cow” 
(Threedy 1994, 5) She argues against conflating the dependence of slave and fetus: “The fetus is 
voiceless and dependent, not because the law renders it so, but because the fetus has not 
developed biologically to that point where speech or autonomy is possible” (Threedy 1994, 5). 
This biological and developmental status must be distinguished from the ideological construction 
of enslaved Africans as dependent. Insofar as enslaved Africans were dependent, it “was the 
consequence of law and society, and not of biological constraints” (Threedy 1994, 5). 
While Threedy criticizes the contras' use of the slavery metaphor, the pros do not escape her 
gimlet-eyed critique: 
To suggest that the life-long and all-encompassing condition of the slave is comparable to 
the temporary condition of pregnancy, or to imply that the degradation and abuse that 
slaves endured is comparable to the impositions of an unwanted pregnancy, can be seen 
as trivializing the enormity of the injury that generations of slavery inflicted upon African 
Americans. (Threedy 1994, 6) 
Threedy's point is cogent, but it is worth noting that pregnant women and African Americans are 
not mutually exclusive classifications. Though many black women are strong defenders of 
women's reproductive freedom (opposed to both forced sterilization and compulsory 
motherhood),18 I imagine that few of them would find the pregnant-woman-as-slave metaphor 
compelling. They are more likely to place themselves in the role of a pregnant enslaved ancestor. 
Considering these “many thousands gone,”19 enslaved women impregnated against their will by 
slaveholders or otherwise subject to an unwanted pregnancy that served the slaveholder's 
economic interests, it strains credulity to suggest that they would not recognize the difference 
between their condition as slaves and their experience of an unwanted pregnancy, except where 
the first led to the second.20 
The ethics and the politics of abortion are deeply racialized as the case of Renae Gibbs 
illustrates. ProPublica reports the story as follows: 
In early 2007, a Lowndes County grand jury indicted Gibbs, a 16-year-old black teen, for 
“depraved heart murder”—defined under Mississippi law as an act “eminently dangerous 
to others … regardless of human life.” By smoking crack during her pregnancy, the 
indictment said, Gibbs had “unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously” caused the death of 
her baby. The maximum sentence: life in prison. (Martin 2014) 
Under the penumbra of anti-abortion activism, represented by legal practices such as this 
Mississippi statute, a mass incarcerating state threatens to extend its reach into the womb. There 
have been a deluge of such cases around the country where anti-abortion activism and a 
racialized war on drugs merge. The typical target has been black girls and women accused of 
abusing illegal drugs. Given the invidious construction of black womanhood, anti-abortion 
activism becomes a site (both old and new) for policing the bodies and capacities of black 
women, which threatens to subjugate them in unprecedented ways. I refer here not to some 
metaphorical slavery but to actual penal slavery: the only form of slavery, after the Fourteenth 
Amendment, that the Constitution sanctions. Here we confront the greatest irony; female 
descendants of enslaved women—who had little control over their reproductive capacities, 
whose wombs were converted intofleshly capital that made slaveholders wealthy—have been 
targeted by a racialized carceral state that despises their liberty. 
Dreading the Dreaded Comparison 
Thus far I have explored the analogy between the ethical status of black people and those of 
fetuses.21 According to the new abolitionists, abortion, reproductive technologies, and stem cell 
research treat the fetus like a slave. Opponents of the unethical treatment of animals make a 
similar claim: humans enslave animals through factory farming, experimentation, as laborers, 
circus performers and the like. Marjorie Spiegel's The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal 
Slavery (1988) represents the most explicit and detailed example of this claim. Though her title 
refers to the general category of human slavery, the particular subject of her book is enslaved, 
subjugated, and oppressed black people. Spiegel posits a reciprocal, prototype/antitype, relation 
between enslaving black people and what she regards as the enslavement of animals. I am 
interested in the ways that humanizing animals becomes the flipside of animalizing black people. 
Does the animal as slave analogy affect historical constructions of black people as beastly—as 
livestock or wild animals, while dogs and cats are beloved members of the white family? 
There are good reasons for dreading the “dreaded comparison.” The analogy presents us with 
two ostensibly mutually exclusive options: amplify the status of animals, and construe them as 
subjects with rights, or “reduce” the status of humans, accenting our evolutionary commonality 
with other animals. As the scare quotation marks suggest, amplify and reduce are non-neutral 
terms. They have different ethical-political implications. As far as I can tell, these options pivot 
on an invidious distinction between human and animal that is transhistorical and transcultural. 
Historically, I know of no human culture that did not make this distinction despite vast 
differences of degree. People of the totem such as Aboriginal Australians, American Indians, and 
some Africans may exhibit a greater intimacy with animals than most humans. But even when 
they venerate animals and imagine their deities in animal form, there is a hierarchical, if not 
invidious distinction between humans and animals (even if only some humans are regarded as 
truly human). Regarding the human/animal distinction, there is no categorical difference as far as 
I can tell between contemporary and prehistoric peoples, Western and non-Western, those with 
complex technologies and those with simple ones—that is, among hunter-gatherer, pastoral, 
agrarian, industrial, and postindustrial peoples. The human/animal distinction appears to be a 
human universal.22 Evolutionary theory holds that animals including humans share a common 
ancestry. My use of the common terms humans and animals should not be read as rejecting the 
claim that humans are a species of animal. 
Hortense Spillers's concept of pornotroping provides the lens through which I view Spiegel's 
argument. Pornotroping extends the term pornography to capture the interplay of power and 
desire—the visual display, before the slaveholder's gaze, of the captured and enslaved black 
body. The black captive body is splayed for pornotroping when external powers invest it with 
“an irresistible and destructive sensuality” and simultaneously reduce it to thing-hood. This 
paradoxical construction deprives the black body of a subject position and reduces it to physical, 
biological, and sexual expressions of otherness (Spillers 1987, 67). Reflecting on Spillers's 
brilliant marriage of pornography and tropology, Alexander G. Weheliye remarks, “How does 
the historical question of violent political domination activate a surplus and excess of sexuality 
that simultaneously sustains and disfigures such brutality? Or, what are the sexual dimensions of 
objectification in slavery and other forms of extreme political and social domination?” 
(Weheliye 2008, 67). These questions inform my inquiry as does a cautionary critique of male 
gaze theory. Drawing on the work of feminist critics who make a similar argument, Robert 
Schultz advises against reducing the male gaze to the pornographic. To paraphrase Kant, we 
should not regard the other as an object of desire only but as a subject also. To preserve space for 
the freedom of desire for men and women, where both are sexual subjects and objects, analysts 
should “distinguish the lover's gaze from the voyeur's” (Schultz 1995, 370–71, 375). In her 
comparative account of black enslavement and animal slavery, is Spiegel a lover or a voyeur? 
Does she distinguish between an ethical concern for the black other and pornotropic desire? 
Despite the liberal, progressive, and left-of-center provenance of her analysis (she is an animal 
rights activist), Spiegel veers closely to the practice of pornotroping black bodies. This speaks to 
the ethical-political ambiguity and ideological promiscuity of pornotroping, which can express 
both subjugating and emancipatory desires. Through a focus on violent spectacle, she equates 
animal and black bodies. In her book, she presents sixteen coupled images that create an 
isomorphism between the black body in pain and animal bodies experiencing torment. The first 
couplet depicts slaves on an auction block in 1861 Virginia; beneath it is a picture of a Chicago 
cattle market in 1868. The facing page provides dictionary definitions of racism and speciesism. 
Couplet two depicts the hot-iron branding of a cow and a black person. Following these images 
an enslaved black person suffers a metal mask-like contraption designed to punish recalcitrant 
slaves; on the facing page, a horse with its head covered with battle armor. The fourth image 
presents a muzzled dog and muzzled black slave side-by-side. The fifth set of images shows a 
shock collar used to train dogs and a metal collar used to control enslaved black people. Each 
photo is captioned: the first describes the joy that comes with a trained dog; the second describes 
the happiness that Negroes experience in the state of bondage, which perfects their true nature. 
The sixth black human/animal couplet presents an enslaved wet nurse with a white infant in her 
lap and “veal calves, separated from their mothers after birth.” Like the enslaved wet nurse, their 
mother's milk will be consumed by humans who are not their offspring. The next set of images 
compares the production practices of egg factories to the gruesome practice of “tight packing” 
Africans on slave ships. Couplet eight displays tiny monkeys that died during transport to the site 
where they would be vivisected; opposite the moneys, enslaved Africans huddle in squatting 
positions similar to those who endured the middle passage of the transatlantic slave trade. The 
ninth and tenth sets of images: first, we see the tools of subjection, a “speculum oris, used to pry 
open the mouths of suicidal slaves” and a stereotaxic instrument that immobilizes animals for 
scientific experimentation; second, we see a syphilis infected chimpanzee juxtaposed to black 
victims of the Tuskegee syphilis study. Image couplets eleven through fifteen present the 
following: an enslaved African immobilized by a large spike collar, a rabbit immobilized for 
eye-irritation tests; rare breed chicks for sale, Negroes for sale; a black man bound to a stake 
being beaten, a fur hunter beating a seal pup to death; a monkey restrained in a laboratory, a 
pilloried enslaved black man. 
The thirteenth set of images, which I describe out of sequence, is special. The Wedgwood anti-
slavery cameo of a kneeling black man, hands bound in slavery and prayer, asking plaintively, 
“Am I not a man and a brother?” On the facing page stands a black hairy ape, from his neck 
hangs a sign that reads: “Am I a man and a brother?” This couplet juxtaposes anti-slavery 
sentiment with Darwin-inspired anxieties about the increasingly fuzzy distinctions between 
human and animal and between white and black. The final images are the masthead of William 
Lloyd Garrison's abolitionist newspaper The Liberator, the title emblazoned in capital letters; on 
the facing page, also in capital letters, the masthead of The Abolitionist: The British Anti-
Vivisection Magazine. As if to underscore a perfect symmetry, the caption notes that the 
magazine's name was later changed to The Liberator. 
Spiegel pornotropes the black body through these coupled images. She uses black subjugation 
and pain to capture our attention and redirect it to the suffering animal. Like rubber-necking 
drivers on the freeway, the carnage captures and, perhaps, enraptures us. This visual display of 
pain and suffering rivets our gaze as reliably and powerfully as images of naked bodies engaged 
in various sexual acts. In the titillated and repulsed gaze of the voyeur, the carnage and the desire 
become one. Sated, mute, and passive, the voyeur crowds out the lover, that is, the person 
inspired to confront the awful practices of white supremacy. Pornotroping is a kind of pandering. 
In the service of animal rights, Spiegel pimps an eroticized violent desire for the black body. In 
addition to this nondiscursive, pornotropic presentation, Spiegel makes a discursive argument 
that centers on three major claims. The enslavement of African peoples and animal slavery are 
equivalent; no difference that makes a genuine ethical difference distinguishes them—racism 
and speciesism are morally equal. Constructing animals as brutes represents the flipside of the 
stereotype of the black brute; undermining one should undermine the other. While many black 
people died as a result of slavery (through capture, dangerous work, abusive punishment and 
neglect), far more animals die from their enslavement. Spiegel advances her claims explicitly 
and obliquely, discursively and non-discursively. 
For the sake of argument, I will accept at face value the implicit claim that animals are enslaved. 
But an important question lurks about: Is animal slavery equivalent to the enslavement of black 
people? I should note that Spiegel does not explicitly say that animals and black people suffer 
identical forms of subjection. Often she evades explicit claims with argument by implication. As 
if cautioning herself against the urge to oversimplify, she observes that a “complex social, 
political, and economic” web determined the life of enslaved black people. In contrast, the 
sociality and political economy of animal subjugation is distinct. Without attributing an ethical 
significance, she acknowledges differences in agency: “between the possible manners in which 
blacks and animals could respond to their respective enslavements. But, as divergent as the 
cruelties and supporting systems of oppression may be, there are commonalities between them” 
(Spiegel 1988, 27–28). They are not identical but essentially the same, since the 
oppressor/oppressed relationship structures both. 
Here we might press Spiegel with the following questions. Ethically speaking, do the 
commonalities of blacks and animals trump the differences? Is their shared essence a “high” 
common denominator or a “low” one?23 Is Spiegel's caution against oversimplifying rooted in a 
difference that should make a difference in how we assess each kind of slavery and oppression? 
Answers to these questions would carry us toward a better understanding of her claim. Spiegel's 
answer seems definitive. The similarities between the ways white people treat black people and 
humans treat animals outweigh the differences. She rejects the notion that we should prioritize 
humans over animals in fighting subjugation; there is no good reason why blacks should be at the 
front of the line. Such thinking only reinforces the very powers subjugating black people. 
Though I do not accept the conventional distinction that some ethicists make between the moral 
and the prudential, Spiegel makes both kinds of argument: thus prioritizing the subjugation of 
black people over that of animals is wrong deontologically; also, it cuts against the best interests 
of black people, simultaneously undermining efforts to overcome their bondage and animal 
bondage. “To deny our similarities to animals is to deny and undermine our own power. It is to 
continue actively struggling to prove to our masters, past or present, that we are similar to those 
who have abused us, rather than to our fellow victims, those whom our masters have also 
victimized” (Spiegel 1988, 30). 
One wonders about the “we” in this statement. Is this merely a rhetorical “we,” or is Spiegel 
identifying with subjugated black people? Whatever the case, she clearly thinks that black people 
have more in common with animals than with white people. She obviously addresses black 
people rather than the entire class of humans when she remarks that trying to prove to “our” 
masters that “we” are similar is a losing proposition, if not a denial of solidarity with subjugated 
animals, which we (black people) ought to acknowledge. Spiegel implies that black people have 
ethical obligations toward animals—to avoid using them for food, work, research, or 
entertainment—that animals do not have toward each other or toward humans. This ethic 
demands more than those associated with any religious tradition I know. It reveals a paradoxical 
kind of human exceptionalism that requires a modification of my earlier claim. As subjects of 
enslavement/subordination, black people have more in common with animals than with white 
people. But as moral subjects (animals who can make promises, alter behavior in line with 
“moral oughts,” and be held to account), black people have more in common with white 
enslavers than with animals subject to human domination. This ambiguity regarding the moral 
exceptionalism of humans troubles her argument. 
So let us ask the question explicitly: are racism and speciesism ethically equivalent? Spiegel's 
argument depends on asserting that they are. Consider the following definitions that she provides 
at the outset of the book (1988, 7): 
racism (rā′ siz əm), n. 1. A belief that human races have distinctive characteristics that 
determine their respective cultures, usually involving the idea that one's own race is 
superior and has the right to rule others. 2. A policy of enforcing such asserted right. 3. A 
system of government and society based upon it.—rac' ist, n., adj. 
speciesism (spē′ shēz iz əm), n. 1. a belief that different species of animals are 
significantly different from one another in their capacities to feel pleasure and pain and 
live an autonomous existence, usually involving the idea that one's own species has the 
right to rule and use others. 2. A policy of enforcing such asserted right. 3. A system of 
government and society based upon it.—spe′ cies ist, n., adj. 
Spiegel appears to have chosen these definitions for their symmetry. This makes sense insofar as 
speciesism depends on the prior definition of racism. But one could clearly imagine 
nonsymmetrical definitions. Despite their symmetry an important difference appears 
immediately. Though speciesism refers to all animal species, only humans are subjects of the 
concept; only human animals are epistemically responsible for acts of speciesism. The 
definitional symmetry of racism and speciesism conceals this fact. This is no small matter. As 
objects of racist subjugation, black people are also subjects who can discourse with white people 
and make ethical demands.24Animals are not subjects in this sense; they are moral objects but not 
moral subjects. Should this lack of moral subjectivity matter? One might argue that infants and 
young children lack moral subjectivity but that does not affect our obligations to them. Often 
teleologically based, this claim holds that infants and young children, excluding abnormal 
circumstances, do become moral subjects. Moral subjectivity is their proper end. We 
acknowledge a class of humans (anencephalics) who because of severe cognitive disability do 
not become moral subjects. As with infants, the teleologically based argument applies in such 
cases. Though disabilities disrupt the proper end of the disabled, many regard that end as 
sufficient to extend to them the umbrella of moral subject and establish our obligations to them. 
Unlike animals, the telos of “normal” human development is epistemic responsibility, the ability 
to make and keep promises—moral subjecthood. 
Not everyone accepts this cognitive, epistemic, and subject-centered notion of moral obligation. 
On this contrary view, the inarticulate cry of animals establishes their interests and the moral 
obligations of humans. Indeed, far from inarticulate, this cry tells us that the animal hurts. The 
animal's attempt to escape the pain tells us all we need to know. Within the limits of the animal's 
cognitive and emotional capacities, we can reasonably infer that suffering accompanies pain. As 
indexical signs, their cries signify pain and distress. So while animals may not be moral subjects 
in an epistemic sense, they are moral subjects insofar as they are sentient beings. Relocating 
moral subjectivity from epistemic capacities to experiences of pain and suffering brings the 
concepts of racism and speciesism closer. But an important and, perhaps, insuperable gap 
remains. Humans—black people specifically, since they bear the marks of race 
paradigmatically25 —suffer in ways animals do not. As far as we know, only humans experience 
humiliation and dishonor. Their traumatic effects may exceed the pain of a red-hot branding iron 
or the loss of a foot or limb as punishment. In Roots, Alex Haley's fictionalized genealogy of his 
family, Toby Reynolds, Haley's enslaved African ancestor, loses his foot. But the greater trauma 
by far is the loss of his African name—Kunta Kinte—and the African geographies, traditions, 
ceremonies, rites, ancestors, and gods integral to the name. Here we enter the distinctively 
intrahuman space of dishonor, the complex, sign-mediated territory of humiliation, degradation, 
and abjection. Recall Patterson's remarks regarding the constitutive relation between dishonor 
and slavery. 
So far our account has shown that the concept of speciesism encodes the paradox of human 
exceptionalism: both the claim that humans, in the relevant sense, are just like other animals and 
the claim that humans (read: black people) have moral obligations that other animals do not. We 
may be squeamish about the predation we see among animals but most thoughtful humans do not 
construe such behavior moralistically. We regard predators such as spiders, snakes, and lions as 
simply doing what they have evolved to do. Humans are products of evolution too. We do what 
we evolved to do. Part of our evolutionary inheritance is the physiological infrastructure to 
communicate through symbolic language. What makes humans highly distinctive among animals 
(one hesitates to say unique) is the practice of ethics, a product of our sign-mediated sociality 
and cultural evolution. Even though humans are animals, we have the capacity to act against our 
biological dispositions in ways that other animals do not. We can describe some evolutionary 
dispositions as bad. We can legally and morally sanction evolved behaviors and foster habits that 
are counter-evolutionary and thus revolutionary. We can choose not to eat meat or, at the very 
least, under optimal circumstances, to eat much less. Spiders, snakes, and lions—three kinds of 
predators—do not have these choices. But as cognitively gifted omnivores, human predators are 
morally exceptional. They can make promises and orient their expectations if not their behavior 
in terms of what ought to be. 
The paradoxical quality of Spiegel's argument has something to with her ambivalence regarding 
the two sides of the Darwinian-inflected argument she makes. On the one side, she rightly notes 
that the theory of common ancestry and descent with modification undermines the conventional 
argument employed by racists regarding the divergent (polygenetic) origins of whites and blacks 
who, on this view, descend from pre-Adamite stock. On the other side, she suppresses what 
Darwin clearly recognized: that organic life lives at the expense of organic life; to be explicit, 
some animals eat other animals. Second only to bacteria, humans are at the top of the food chain. 
Humans have evolved in such a way that they can eat virtually every kind of animal. Humans are 
the ultimate predators. While Spiegel insists on regarding humans as animals, she does not 
reflect on our evolutionary heritage as predators. Further, she ignores the pain and suffering of 
animals in the bloody jaws of other animals. She does not explain why this behavior differs from 
human behavior. Spiegel's normative claim that humans should not enslave animals encodes 
assumptions about animals and humans that she does not acknowledge, much less detail. 
Indifference, cruelty, and species-regard (what she invidiously calls anthropocentrism and 
speciesism) are surely part of the evolutionary development of humans in the same way that 
herding, hiving, swarming, and other social behaviors are part of the evolutionary heritage of 
animals. Yet, she does not reflect on human obligations to animals in light of this bloody fact; 
nor does she tackle the difficult question of “animal ethics”—do animals have moral obligations 
to other animals including humans? Given Spiegel's unacknowledged and thus unreflected 
human exceptionalism, she does not even pose the question. She does not explain why 
preferential regard for the human species—which grows concentric circle by circle from a 
preferential regard for self, offspring, and kin to tribe, nation, and cosmopolis—is different than 
the preferences other animals have (assuming they do) for their species. Specifically, how do the 
species-regard and concentrically nested preferences of humans differ from those of bonobos or 
giraffes? Spiegel's claim depends on answers to these questions. She does not provide any. 
Spiegel piles one paradox on another. She criticizes black people for dreading the dreaded 
comparison between them and animals.26 She claims that such dread expresses the speciesism of 
black people. On this view, black speciesism is equivalent to endorsing racist characterizations 
of Mexicans, Vietnamese, or other subdominant “races,” of distinguishing black people from 
“inferiors” while identifying with the dominant white race they perceive as more like them. 
Rather than looking down their anthropocentric qua racist noses, black people should resist the 
brutish and beastly construction of animals.27 Insofar as they do not, they reinforce the 
brutalizing and beast-making practices of white supremacy. In their misplaced desire to 
assimilate into the white human mainstream, black people betray their obligations to fellow 
victims when they ratify invidious constructions of animals. This ratification boomerangs and 
intensifies brutalizing and beast-making practices under which animals and black people alike 
continue to suffer. Speaking from the position of privilege (dare I say white supremacy), Spiegel 
is remarkably unsympathetic toward efforts of black people to resist racist constructions of them 
as brutish animals. She deems their “we're human too” resistance as speciesist, as collaborating 
with slaveholders in denigrating animals. Her racial privilege and ethical-political naiveté is on 
full display when she criticizes Sterling Brown's classic essay, “Negro Character as Seen by 
White Authors” (1933), as collaborating with the enemy. She claims that Brown strengthens the 
negative views expressed by these racist authors when he disparages the correlations of good 
slave and docile mastiff, bad slave and mad dog. “Brown's ‘mastiffs,’ ‘mad dogs,’ and ‘gorilla-
like imbeciles’ reveal not only the predilections of the authors whose work he critiques, but of 
Brown himself” (Spiegel 1988, 36). In short, black people such as Sterling Brown are 
simultaneously too sensitive and not sensitive enough. They are offended by the wrong thing. By 
virtue of the fact that their ancestors suffered enslavement and their descendants the effects of 
white supremacy, black people should be especially sensitive to the abuse of animals; they 
should recognize correlations between the black experience and the animal experience; 
moreover, they should not dread comparisons of them and animals. Realizing perhaps the 
controversial nature of these claims, she dandles them before the reader as implication and writes 
them between the lines of her explicit argument. 
Spiegel demands moral heroism of black people. A special concern for animals should 
characterize their fight against white supremacy. They should acknowledge a shared animality 
and subjugation to (white?) humans. Spiegel's expectations are naïve and blameworthy. Reading 
her analysis, one might think that black people made choices in the relatively safe space of the 
university, salon, or coffee house. The reader might conclude that black people chose the 
discursive conditions under which they contested white supremacy. The reader might even 
conclude that black people had the luxury of taking their humanity for granted in a context where 
the attribution or denial of humanity was a powerful form of ideological capital, where white 
people routinely described black people as animals, and those descriptions had life and death 
consequences. Acknowledging Spiegel's genuine concern for animals, the discerning reader 
might conclude that white privilege is blind. 
If the escaped slave represents the prototypical criminal in the American imagination, then the 
flipside of criminalizing black people is animalizing them. The train of associations runs from 
escaped slave, to criminal, to animal, or animalistic criminal, as the case may be. It is crucial to 
remember that Spiegel's comparison is not between animals and generic humans but between 
animals and black people. 
The suffering animals currently endure at the hands of human beings in laboratories, on 
“factory farms,” as pets, and in the wild, sadly parallels that endured by black people in 
the antebellum United States and during the lingering postbellum period. The parallels of 
experience are numerous. Both humans and animals share the ability to suffer from 
restricted freedom of movement, from the loss of social freedom, and to experience pain 
at the loss of a loved one. Both groups suffer or suffered from their common capacity to 
be terrified by being hunted, tormented, or injured. Both have been “objectified,” treated 
as property rather than as feeling, self-directed individuals. And both blacks, under the 
system of slavery, and animals were driven to a state of total psychic and physical defeat, 
as a result of all or some of the variables mentioned above (With animals, of course, this 
continues today in its most extreme form.). (Spiegel 1988, 31) 
In this passage and in her argument as a whole, Spiegel makes three claims: racism and 
speciesism are morally equal; brutish animals and the black brute are two sides of the same 
stereotype; and while there are striking parallels between the black experience and the animal 
experience, the latter currently suffer more. Where white slaveholders punished black people for 
insolence, dairy farmers slaughter cows. If slavery ripped apart the families of enslaved black 
people without a second thought, then imagine the untold suffering caused by the destruction of 
the familial and social relations of animals. Where enslaved Africans suffered immensely during 
the middle passage, slaughter often awaits animals at the end of their journey (Spiegel 1988, 44, 
46, 58). If patrollers hunted runaway slaves like rabbits (and like their animal namesakes—
ape, buck, coon, fox, and monkey, and if “nigger hunters” targeted black people during the Nadir 
(1880–1940) but with decreasing regularity since that high tide of white terror, then animal 
suffering at the hands of human predators is greater by several orders of magnitude 
(Spiegel 1988, 33, 60–61). Through studies such as Bad Blood (1981), Medical 
Apartheid (2006), and The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks (2010), we have become familiar 
with the history of medical experimentation on black people. But if black people were “the first 
laboratory animals in America,” then medical experimentation on animals represents a gruesome 
perfection of the practice (Spiegel 1988, 66–67, 70). In Spiegel's account, black suffering (from 
slavery to the lynching of James Byrd, Jr. to mass incarceration) is a pretext, a tactic for 
leveraging the even greater suffering of animals. 
Spiegel engages in genuine comparative moral inquiry but the emotional weight of her analysis 
rests with animals rather than black people. She is an animal rights activist, not an anti-racism 
activist. This may have something to do with the temporal asymmetry in her account. Beyond 
living memory, the suffering of enslaved Africans lacks urgency. In contrast, animals are 
currently enslaved, the intensity of which has grown exponentially with the advent of factory 
farming. Though animals suffered under older preindustrial regimes of enslavement, they suffer 
even more today on the farm and in the laboratory. While the enslavement of black people 
reminds us of a shameful past, we encounter animal slavery as a morally and existentially urgent 
present. As an indexical sign, the enslavement and suffering of black people in the past points to 
the present suffering of animals. 
Conclusion 
For the sake of argument, I used Spiegel's language of animal slavery as if it were not 
controversial and possibly self-evident. I suspect, however, that the reader has discerned 
skepticism in my account. I am deeply troubled by Spiegel's lack of sympathy, insight, and 
compassion regarding black people's dread of the “dreaded comparison.” She exhibits a 
distressing lack of self-consciousness regarding her privileged “subject position.” She speaks 
from the position of mastery—the vantage point of the slaveholder, the ruling class, of those 
defined as racially normal—that white supremacy created. This may explain the curious lack of 
context, tone-deafness, and ahistoricism of an ostensibly historical and comparative account of 
black and animal subjugation. She ignores the ideological contexts of the ethical-political 
choices that black people made; the subject position the discourse of white supremacy assigned 
them; the implication of that assignment for how black people might understand their relations to 
animals. Recall her blithe dismissal of Sterling Brown's brief against animalizing black people. 
Black people such as Brown are simply collaborators in treating animals unethically. Victimized 
by a white supremacist commonwealth, they should know better than to engage in similar 
practices. She regards their behavior as particularly blameworthy. Again, this view displays a 
remarkable lack of sympathy regarding the discursive conditions28 under which black people 
fought the animal-making practices of white supremacy. The fact that Alice Walker wrote the 
preface to Spiegel's book does not mitigate my negative judgment. 
Spiegel clearly intends to elevate the status of animals by making the dreaded comparison less 
dreadful, an ethical goal that I support. But this goal will not be achieved so long as white animal 
rights activists ignore their subject position and disregard the history of animalizing black people 
in a white supremacist and beast-making society. In the interest of animals, they need to do the 
requisite moral work; the kind of work that Spiegel and most white animal rights activists have 
not done. They need to place the burden of this moral work where it properly belongs. They need 
to recognize the immense ideological work of the dreaded comparison in subordinating black 
people and do the requisite work to combat it. Hectoring black people for their insensitivity or 
chiding them for hypersensitivity is the wrong strategy. In the absence of such moral and 
ideological work, I worry about the diminution if not the subordination of black suffering. I 
worry that standard forms of animal rights advocacy unintentionally animalize black 
people.29 The brutalizing and beast-making rhetoric of PETA in the wake of the Michael Vick 
affair is illustrative. PETA animalized Vick even as they humanized the dogs that he abused and 
killed. This discursive symmetry forcefully reminds us of how dreadful the dreaded comparison 
can be. Melissa Harris-Perry underscores a historical source of this dread, which produces 
disparate perceptions among black and white Americans about the Michael Vick affair. She 
remarks that dogs “were used by enslavers to catch, trap and return those who were trying to 
escape to freedom. Dogs were used to terrorize Civil Rights demonstrators. In short, animals 
have been weapons used against black bodies and black interests in ways that have deep 
historical resonance.” She adds: “Not only have animals been used as weapons against black 
people, but many African Americans feel that the suffering of animals evokes more empathy and 
concern among whites than does the suffering of black people” (Harris-Perry 2010).30 At issue is 
the historical and comparative ethical-political status of black people and animals in the moral 
imagination of white people. Are black people less than dogs? Are they entitled to less sympathy 
and solicitude? 
Despite my criticism of Spiegel's argument, I reject the view that the enslavement of black 
people should not be used as a metaphor. But it should be done skillfully and with care. The 
rhetorical use of slavery to describe the ethics of abortion, reproductive freedom, and the 
treatment of animals does not necessarily trivialize the enslavement of black people. In the hands 
of someone with more insight than Spiegel (or PETA's Ingrid Newkirk), this rhetoric might very 
well expand our moral imagination and enhance our deliberations about important ethical 
matters. However, when the rhetor is inept, the rhetoric of slavery—animal, pregnant woman, or 
fetus—may trivialize the historical enslavement of black people, their experience of neo-slavery 
in the post-emancipation south, and successive regimes of subordination that extend to the 
current era of colorblind racism and mass incarceration. The slavery metaphor may feed the 
American disposition toward historical forgetfulness, the habit of denying or otherwise 
minimizing injury. Regarding the not so hidden injuries of racism structured by white supremacy 
we see a persistent desire to change the subject among historians, politicians, and producers of 
American popular culture. Right-wing opponents of reproductive freedom and left-wing 
opponents of the unethical treatment of animals sometimes exhibit the same dis-ease. They deny 
important distinctions between born and unborn, human and animal, between slavery as a 
historical phenomenon and slavery as a metaphor. With unethical silence, radical animal rights 
advocates conceal the predatory similarities between humans and animals. Meanwhile, abortion 
opponents exaggerate the similarities between fetus and slave. I acknowledge the sincerity and 
moral passion of some who construe the fetus as slave to the desires of the mother and abortion 
doctors. But the analogy is weak and troubled by too many complications. Comparatively 
speaking, though skeptical of the notion, I find the argument for animal slavery more 
compelling. Slavery signifies in ways that they (ethical rhetoricians) and we can neither 
anticipate nor control. As terministic screen, the word “slavery” directs our attention in ethically 
significant ways. Does it humanize animals or animalize black people? Does it elevate concern 
for the fetus or distract us from catastrophic black infant mortality rates and a historical disregard 
for the wellbeing of black children? There are good reasons to be suspicious of the ethics of 
slavery as ethical rhetoric. Though its use may not always be wrong, slavery as ethical rhetoric 
will always be controversial. 
Footnotes 
1. People of African descent use a number of self-descriptors. My use mirrors that fact. 
Thus I use African, African American, black people, people of African descent, 
Blackamerican, and Negro. 
2. By “African,” I refer to those whose phenotype historically fall under the categories of 
Negro, Negroid, and black, as well as those who do not conform to the “standard 
phenotype” but are regarded as African-descended nonetheless. 
3. Ham is interpreted as having or desiring to have carnal knowledge of his father. 
4. Goldenberg does not consider the role of white supremacy in constructing this 
preference. He treats as an antecedent what arguably, until shown otherwise, should be 
regarded as an artifact of colonial encounters between Europeans who described 
themselves as white and the natives they encountered as colored. This naïve acceptance 
of the data in a context crying out for critical race inquiry represents a glaring deficiency. 
5. While agreeing that Goldenberg achieves his stated goal of defending the biblical text 
from attributions of racism, Harrill (2004, 511–12) notes that there are stereotypical, 
hypersexualized images of Ethiopians in patristic Christian literature and that monastic 
stories were not neutral sources for representing people of African descent. Though 
Harrill does not address this issue, attribution of hypersexuality to Ethiopians certainly 
prefigures a common element of modern racialized antiblackness. See Brakke 2001. 
6. While praising Goldenberg's account, one reviewer notes that he does not address the 
question of why “(occurring somewhere between the 2nd century BCE and the 2nd 
century CE) the rabbinical and then the patristic writers began to firmly attach blackness 
to the slave state” (Miller 2005, 833). 
7. In a devastating review, Jonathan Schorsch criticizes Goldenberg for an “inability to see 
the forest for the trees.” He sees clearly that “the Bible is not the source of antiblack 
racism” (Schorsch 2007, 169). However, this blinds him to the antiblack ethnocentrism 
and racism that characterize Schorsch's sources. The following is one of his more 
trenchant remarks: “Goldenberg's positive reading of rabbinic material contradicts his 
own evidence, which shows that many Greco-Romans and thinkers from all three post 
biblical monotheisms held antiblack views, whether metaphorical, somatic, ethnic, or 
some combination thereof. Goldenberg's discomfort with considering negative meanings 
of blackness is surprising in light of his own admission that throughout the postbiblical 
world, including Judean spheres, ‘most Blacks, as foreigners in general, were slaves’ 
(134). It makes one wonder how convincing it is to argue that such denigrating attitudes 
had no sociopolitical ramifications. I am amazed to learn, for example, that the 
‘accumulating negative effects of Black-as-sinner-or-devil exegesis’—based on classical 
climatic notions, among other things (i.e., that blacks were lowly, cowards, ugly, 
deformed by their environment—does not ‘reflect an antipathy toward black Africans’ 
(51). Goldenberg himself concludes, after much back-bending dismissal, that the trope of 
the accursed Ham as a black ‘certainly dates to the fourth century (R. Joseph; redaction of 
the Palestinian Talmud), probably to the third century (Marqe), and possibly to the 
second or third century (tannaitic etiology)’ (156). It is astounding to me that Goldenberg 
concludes that medieval Arabic and early modem English sources wielded blackness as 
an ethnic identifier but that rabbinic sources using the originally ethnic term ‘Kushite’ 
referred only to somatic color (198)” (Schorsch 2007, 170). 
8. I do not agree with Graber's view of how constitutional evils such as slavery should be 
handled. See Robin L. Einhorn's (2006) review of Graber. 
9. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), at 407 (emphasis added). 
10. Some might argue that the dead are not subjects of rights even in this limited sense. If 
there is a right lurking about, then it the right of the living—surviving family members, 
friends, and others—not to be offended by such practices. 
11. Among states that have experienced agitation for a personhood amendment are Alabama, 
Colorado, Iowa, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Oklahoma. 
12. For an illuminating essay on the ideological complexities surrounding the black female 
body and the black fetus, see Bridges 2002. Bridges shows how the sale of fetal tissue is 
likely to have disproportionately negative, market-subjugating effects, on black women. 
Their greater economic vulnerability makes it more likely that they will be enticed to sell 
their body parts and fetuses. The purported concern with the black fetus expressed by 
some groups, she argues, is belied by their and society's lack of concern for black infants 
and children (2002, 156–57). 
13. For an interesting account of the complexities of abortion and race, see Beisel and 
Kay 2004. 
14. For examples of the debate, see J. Allen 2008; Edwin 1994; McFadden 1999; 
Pollitt 2004; and Buckley 1997. 
15. For an example of this kind of argument, see Kuswa, Achter, and Lauzon 2008. 
16. The authors of “The Slave, the Fetus, the Body,” who construe unwanted pregnancy and 
compulsory motherhood as “involuntary servitude,” are clearly aware of this issue. See 
Kuswa, Achter, and Lauzon 2008, 178, 182. 
17. This is a variation on William James's trope of “moral holiday.” 
18. For an essay on the dangers of equating pregnancy and motherhood, see 
Hanigsberg 1995. “The political and legal constructions that pit women's self-interest, 
and assert that this interest must be a unified and fixed one, against a concern for “fetal 
life” fundamentally misconstrue the relationships of women to their own bodies and to 
intrauterine life. By envisioning women as uniform containers that may be emptied at 
will, the law ignores and perhaps destroys any concept of women's bodily integrity, 
nullifies the role of the mother, and at the same time, paradoxically establishes women's 
bodies as always maternal” (1995, 417). 
19. This phrase comes from the Negro Spiritual “No More Auction Block for Me” and is also 
the title of an essay by James Baldwin. See Baldwin 1955. 
20. For the most comprehensive account of black women and the politics of reproduction, see 
Roberts 1997. 
21. Again, let me emphasize the obvious: that all black people were once fetuses, even if the 
fetus is often racialized as white. 
22. I am willing to be corrected but know of no evidence to the contrary. 
23. Drawing on Judaism and Christianity, a high common denominator would be the notion 
that all sentient organisms bear the image of God. This view would require a 
reconstruction of traditional Jewish and Christian notions of humanity, animality, and 
divinity. 
24. There is an interesting debate among bloggers on the issue of racism and speciesism. A 
self-described “white-skinned (half-Persian by birth), queer, feminist vegan,” Katrina Fox 
believes that one can argue for veganism and animal rights from an intersectional 
position. See Fox 2011. 
25. In an economy of visibility (blackness/deviance) and invisibility (whiteness/normality), 
blackness bears the marks of race. 
26. There is quite a debate among vegans in the blogosphere regarding the animal welfare, 
rights, and abolitionist practice of comparing the treatment of animals and black people. 
Among the more interesting is the website “Animal Writes.” The post in question was 
published on Saturday, November 22, 2008 under the title: “Privilege: The U.S. Vegan 
Movement, Whiteness, and Race Relations (part 1 & 2)” with the byline Sistah Vegan. 
The author criticizes the insouciance regarding the black/animal comparison and 
blindness to their own white privilege of animal rights activists such as Ingrid Newkirk of 
PETA. The author laments the way that black vegans are rendered invisible. She remarks 
that “the neutrality of the word and idea of ‘animal’ for white middle-class animal 
advocates means something quite different to people of color who are always at risk of 
not being fully human in our racist society. Thus, when white vegans say that because 
they are not offended at being compared to animals neither should people of color, they 
equivocate between two grossly different contexts.” Here she quotes another vegan of 
color: “Many white folks are perfectly happy to insist that they have no problems at all 
being compared to animals—but it is not white folks that are being killed on genocidal 
turkey shoots either … this comparison of brown human beings to animals/insects, is not 
something in the past that is occasionally drawn on to make a point. [It] is something that 
exists in the very fabric of our current society and as such, carries very real 
repercussions” (Animal Writes 2008). 
27. For a similar view, see Roberts 2008. Roberts defines animalization as “the process of 
consigning humans to the status of ‘beast'—a consignment that often subjects them to 
mastery, domination, exploitation, and in the worst cases, slaughter.” This process is 
based on the presumed inferiority and brutality of animals and their relative proximity of 
some human groups (2008, ix–x). 
28. I have Foucault's technical account of discursive formations in mind. See Foucault 1972. 
29. The Facebook page of Abolitionists Against Animal Slavery shows shackled Africans (a 
scene from the movie Amistad) juxtaposed to an image of shackled elephants. Ostensibly 
progressive sites such as this are oblivious if not consciously insensitive to the 
animalization of black people. They behave as if these images appear in a racially neutral 
context, as if white supremacy does not 
exist. http://www.facebook.com/pages/Abolitionists-Against-Animal-
Slavery/150299344986775 (accessed 02/18/2013). 
30. For a different if not opposing view, see Hribal 2007. While Vick was animalized, PETA 
was in litigation regarding the personhood of orcas. See PETA 2012 and Todd 2012. 
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